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U.S. Military Operations in the Global War on Terrorism: 
Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia
Summary
U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia
are part of the U.S.-initiated Global War on Terrorism (GWOT).  These operations
cover a wide variety of combat and non-combat missions ranging from combating
insurgents, to civil affairs and reconstruction operations, to training military forces
of other nations in counternarcotics, counterterrorism,  and counterinsurgency tactics.
Numbers of U.S. forces involved in these operations range from 18,000 to just a few
hundred. Some have argued that U.S. military operations in these countries are
achieving a degree of success and suggest that they may offer some lessons that
might be applied in Iraq as well as for future GWOT operations.  Potential issues for
Congress include NATO assumption of responsibility for operations in Afghanistan,
counterdrug operations in Afghanistan, a long-term strategy for Africa, and
developments in Colombia and the Philippines. This report will not discuss the
provision of equipment and weapons to countries where the U.S. military is
conducting counterterrorism operations1 nor will it address Foreign Military Sales
(FMS), which are also aspects of the Administration’s GWOT military strategy.  This
report will be updated on a periodic basis.
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U.S. Military Operations and the
Global War on Terrorism: Afghanistan,
Africa, the Philippines, and Colombia
Overview
U.S. military operations as part of the Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) began
on October 7, 2001, and continue today.  The military component is just one aspect
in this endeavor, which also involves diplomatic, intelligence, law enforcement, and
financial efforts intended to defeat terrorists around the world.  This report focuses
on U.S. military operations in four areas —  Afghanistan, Africa, the Philippines, and
Colombia — although the U.S. military is likely engaged in a variety of activities in
other countries or regions that are considered part of the GWOT by the
Administration.  While some consider military operations in Iraq as part of this war,
many do not, and because of the complexity of this issue, Iraq is treated separately
and in greater detail in other CRS reports.2 
Congress has a wide ranging interest in U.S. military operations in these regions.
NATO assumption of responsibility for Afghanistan and its impact on U.S. military
operations, counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan, and the apparently emerging




There are approximately 19,000 U.S. military personnel in and around
Afghanistan.  Troops currently in Afghanistan represent the sixth major troop
rotation in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) since the United States became
involved in the fall of 2001. At present, the majority of U.S. ground forces come
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from the Army’s Italy-based 173rd Airborne Brigade and the 1st Brigade of the Fort
Bragg North Carolina-based 82nd Airborne Division and Marine elements from the
Second (II) MEF from Camp Lejeune, North Carolina.  U.S. Special Forces are also
operating in Afghanistan and are primarily concerned with capturing or killing
Taliban and Al Qaeda leaders.  In addition, Army units from the Florida National
Guard’s 53rd Infantry Brigade will be deployed to train the Afghan National Army
(ANA).5 
Information concerning major unit participation for OEF 7 has not been
provided by the Department of Defense (DOD) nor by U.S. Central Command
(CENTCOM). It is believed that the headquarters of the Fort Drum, New York-based
10th Mountain Division and the division’s 3rd and 4th Brigade Combat Teams (BCT)
will deploy to Afghanistan in the spring of 2006 and will constitute the majority of
U.S. ground forces in the region. Reports suggest that the Army has completed its
2007 deployment plans, and are working on a 2008 deployment plan and the Marines
are also working on deployment plans out to 2008.6
Security for Parliamentary Elections. U.S. and Coalition forces have
increased force levels and undertaken operations in conjunction with the Afghan
National Army (ANA) and National Police to quell insurgent violence in the run up
to Afghanistan’s September 18, 2005 nation-wide National Assembly and Provincial
Council elections. About 700 members of the 82nd Airborne’s 1st Battalion, 325th
Airborne Infantry Regiment deployed to Afghanistan at the end of July to assist in
security operations.7 This deployment is expected to last four months but could be
extended if required.8 The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) also plans to
send approximately 2,000 troops to Afghanistan by September to provide additional
security for the elections.9 NATO is expected to deploy three additional battalions,
a quick reaction force, and an “over-the-horizon” force to augment security — a force
package similar to that used in the October 2004 Afghan presidential elections.
Although NATO has not provided official details, Romania, France, Spain, and the
Netherlands were reportedly expected to provide a battalion each for this effort.10 In
addition, Australia will reportedly deploy about 150 special forces soldiers to
Afghanistan prior to the elections, but these soldiers will likely join U.S. special
CRS-3
11 Janaki Kremmer, “Australia Reassesses Afghan Effort,” Christian Science Monitor, July
22, 2005.
12 “Official: U.S., Afghan Forces Kill 40 Militants,” MSNBC.com, August 22, 2005.
13 “Neutralized Warlords,” Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 7, 2005 and David
S. Cloud, “Afghan Warlords Slowly Come in From the Cold,” Wall Street Journal, March
14, 2005. 
14 Michael Griffin, “Hard Road Ahead for Afghan Leader,” Jane’s Intelligence Review,
February 1, 2005. 
15 Carlotta Gall, “U.S. Troops Training Pakistani Units Fighting Qaeda,” New York Times,
April 27, 2005.
16 Carlotta Gall, “Pakistanis Pursue Qaeda Forces in Offensive on Afghan Border,” New
York Times, March 7, 2005.
17 Ibid.
forces in the effort to destroy insurgent leadership.11 As of August 22, approximately
10,500 NATO troops (including the NATO-led International Security and Assistance
Force - ISAF) had reportedly been deployed to Afghanistan to provide security for
the elections.12
 
Operational Issues.  
Changing Nature of the Conflict?   In early 2005, some  postulated that the
nature of the conflict in Afghanistan was changing. Reports suggest that Afghan
warlords are being “co-opted” and that various warlords are peacefully ceding13
power to the Afghan government. Efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate the
various militia groups controlled by warlords has “helped to disarm more than half
of the country’s 60,000 irregular fighters and canton 8,018 tanks, armored  personnel
carriers and artillery pieces — 95 percent of the heavy weapons estimated to be in the
hands of  “unofficial” military commanders.”14  The Afghan government and the U.S.
military have long sought to demobilize and reintegrate local militias and curb the
influence of regional warlords that were seen by many as a threat to the fledgling
Afghan national government.   
Another change is improved cooperation with the Pakistani military. U.S. forces
are reportedly training Pakistani forces in night flying and helicopter assault
techniques that could be useful in military operations in the border region.15 Pakistani
military efforts in the South Waziristan border region in 2004 reportedly resulted in
the destruction of at least two insurgent training camps — disrupting the operations
of hundreds of foreign militants operating in the region as well as killing or capturing
more than 300 insurgents — at the cost of about 200 Pakistani soldiers killed.16
Pakistan is believed to have  75,000 soldiers deployed along the border conducting
offensive operations in the North Waziristan region. Current operations are more
discrete — relying on specific target intelligence, than last year’s wide sweeps which
resulted in numerous casualties on both sides.17  Despite Pakistan’s military
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cooperation, Pakistan is still widely criticized for “accommodating pro-Taliban
forces” in the country.18 
Early in 2005, U.S. military officials reportedly noted that attacks and firefights
involving U.S. forces had decreased to the point where violent contacts were
becoming “rare”and that many areas that were previously insecure were now safe and
that Afghans were becoming “increasingly cordial” to Americans.19  This trend was
attributed to Afghan security forces exerting a more forceful presence in violent
areas of the country making the environment less hospitable to insurgent forces.20 As
a result of the improved security situation, U.S. forces have been able to turn more
of its attention to reconstruction operations.21  Others suggest that the Taliban’s
failure to disrupt last year’s Afghan presidential elections as promised and the
Afghan government’s offer of amnesty to many Taliban leaders and their followers
have resulted in poor morale within the ranks of the insurgents.22  A Taliban
spokesman, however, reportedly attributed its inaction during the winter of 2004 to
the weather and promised it would regroup and renew attacks in the spring when the
weather improved.23
Renewed Insurgent Attacks. U.S. forces renewed attempts in April and
May 2005 to end the insurgency by operating in the border provinces where the
Taliban continue to exert a degree of control. On March 27, a mine exploded under
a U.S. military vehicles south of Kabul killing four U.S. soldiers.24 In early April, a
U.S. military spokesman acknowledged that “the number and severity of attacks
against Afghan and coalition forces have increased compared to winter.”25  On April
12, Afghan forces were ambushed by about 30 to 35 insurgents near Khost — about
90 miles south of Kabul — and U.S. troops and warplanes responded in support,
resulting in two U.S. wounded and about 12 insurgents killed.26  U.S. and local
Afghan forces came under attack on May 4 in Zabol province, resulting in six U.S.
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soldiers wounded and approximately 45 insurgents killed.27 In both the April 12 and
May 4 attacks, U.S. fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters were credited with causing
the majority of insurgent casualties.  Two U.S. Marines were killed battling
insurgents in Laghman province on May 8; two U.S. soldiers were killed and eight
wounded in a mortar attack at a firebase near the Pakistan border on June 9 ; and one
U.S. soldier was killed and three wounded during an insurgent ambush in Paktika
province on June 10.28  In late June, U.S. forces began operating in the Khakeran
valley in southern Afghanistan — a reported insurgent sanctuary about 130 miles
northeast of Kandahar.29  This operation, undertaken in response to renewed
insurgent attacks, resulted in as many as 178 insurgents killed — primarily from U.S.
military aircraft attacks.  
While some believe that the insurgency is in decline, others — citing the scope
and intensity of fighting in the spring months of 2005 — suggest otherwise. Some
U.S. and Afghan officials reportedly characterize the insurgents as limited in their
mobility and unable to seize territory and hold it, but nevertheless a force well
equipped with personnel, weapons, and money.30  They note that while the Taliban
may be unable to hold ground, they can continue the insurgency “indefinitely,
attacking the fledgling Afghan government, scaring away aid groups, and leaving the
province ungovernable.”  Taliban ranks have reportedly been rapidly replenished by
recruits coming in from Pakistan.  The insurgents have been operating in groups of
20 or more, using rocket propelled grenades and light machine guns, and have been
able to stand and fight for hours, despite taking heavy casualties.  Perhaps in a shift
of tactics to avoid additional casualties, U.S. and Afghan military officials note that
insurgents have recently begun ambushing soldiers with the roadside improvised
explosives that have proven successful in Iraq.
Special Operations Helicopter Downing and Ensuing Actions. On
June 28th, a U.S. MH-47 Chinook helicopter with the U.S. 160th Special Operations
Aviation Regiment (SOAR) was shot down by insurgents as they were attempting to
reinforce a four-man SEAL (U.S. Navy’s Sea, Air, and Land Special Operations
Force) team under attack by insurgent forces north of Asadabad.  Eight members of
the helicopter’s crew and an eight-man SEAL response force were killed in the crash.
In addition, three of the four SEALs that they were trying to reinforce were killed by
attacking insurgents. One wounded SEAL survived and was eventually returned to
U.S. control after he was given refuge by some local inhabitants. It has been
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speculated that the four-man SEAL team was involved in either locating or
attempting to capture or kill Taliban leader Ahmad Shaw — a warlord loyal to
Mullah Omar and with considerable influence over the Asadabad region.31
After the downing, approximately 300 U.S. troops, supported by military
aircraft, began hunting the insurgents responsible for the attack.32  Some suggested
that while some of the insurgents may have remained in the area,  many had fled into
Pakistan, and, on July 14, U.S. forces reportedly killed 24 suspected insurgents
fleeing into Pakistan. 33  The U.S. military reportedly concluded its operation aimed
at insurgents responsible for SEAL ambush and helicopter downing on August 21.
A U.S. military spokesman claimed that during the week-long operation, U.S. forces
had been in 29 separate engagements and had killed more than 40 insurgents.34 On
July 24, six U.S. soldiers were wounded in an ambush in eastern Afghanistan when
an improvised explosive device detonated near a convoy and the unit came under
small arms fire.35  Some reports suggest that many of these improvised explosives are
becoming more sophisticated — often using long- range cordless phones to remotely
detonate them under vehicles. Some Afghan military officials have accused the
Pakistani military and intelligence service of providing the insurgents with not only
bombs, but also other military supplies and equipment.36  On August 4, another U.S.
soldier was killed in Paktika province by a roadside bomb and, on August 12, a
soldier was killed when his convoy was ambushed by small arms and rocket-
propelled grenades.37  According to DOD, from January 1 to August 6, 2005, 39 U.S.
service members were killed in action (KIA) and 120 wounded in action (WIA) with
another 24 service members dying in accidents or by other causes in Operation
Enduring Freedom.38
U.S. Marines and Afghan Special Forces launched a large offensive operation
against insurgents in the Korengal Valley near the Pakistan border on August 13.39
On August 18, two U.S. soldiers traveling in a convoy were killed by a roadside
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bomb in Kandahar province.40  On August 21, a bomb planted under a wooden bridge
detonated as a U.S. convoy was crossing killing four U.S. soldiers.41
Permanent Presence and Bases in Afghanistan?42  There are
indications that the United States may seek permanent military bases in Afghanistan.
Reportedly, the United States will upgrade U.S. military facilities in Afghanistan —
primarily at the airbases of Bagram and Kandahar, which are currently being
equipped with new runways.  Afghan leaders are said to be seeking a “long-term
strategic partnership” with the United States and other friendly countries to avoid a
strategic disengagement by the international community like the West’s 1990s
disengagement that helped to bring the Taliban to power.  Senior U.S. military and
government officials have acknowledged that bases, and perhaps pre-positioned U.S.
military equipment, are a possibility, but note that there are numerous regional
sensitivities to such a plan.
International Security and Assistance Force (ISAF)
ISAF is a NATO-led organization, normally consisting of approximately 8,000
troops from 26 NATO nations, as well as troops from nine partner and two non-
aligned countries.43  The United States has approximately 200 troops assigned to
ISAF, but these troops serve primarily in staff and support roles.  ISAF operates
under a series of U.N. mandates and conducts security patrols in Kabul and
surrounding districts and runs several Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRT)
located throughout Afghanistan.  In addition, ISAF coordinates Civil Military
Cooperation projects throughout the area of operations.44  ISAF currently does not
participate in offensive operations against the Taliban and Al Qaeda — these
operations are carried out by the U.S.-led CJTF-180 and forces from 19 other
countries45 (including some countries that have other forces assigned to ISAF) and
the ANA. 
Current Situation.  On August 4, the Italian Rapid Deployment Corps took
over command of ISAF from the Turkish Rapid Deployment Corps, which had been
in command of ISAF since February 2005.46  The Italian Rapid Deployment Corps
will command ISAF until May 2006 and then relinquish command to the British-led
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Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARCC), which will command ISAF
for nine months.47 In February, NATO agreed to expand ISAF coverage into western
Afghanistan, providing security assistance to an estimated 50 percent of
Afghanistan.48  As previously noted, NATO plans to temporarily increase ISAF by
approximately 2,000 soldiers by September to assist in upcoming Afghan elections.
NATO Assumption of Overall Afghan Security
In February 2005, NATO and the United States agreed to merge ISAF and the
U.S.-led Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) under NATO command.49  This merger
is expected to occur in late 2006 and essentially involves NATO expansion into
southern Afghanistan and other volatile regions of the country such as the Pakistani
border region.  Some suggest that this action could result in the substantial reduction
of U.S. forces in Afghanistan50 but details regarding U.S. troop strength have not yet
been decided. U.S. troops remaining in Afghanistan would be under NATO control
and it is unclear if the United States would keep a separate force under U.S. control
in Afghanistan to continue to hunt for senior Al Qaeda and Taliban leadership
believed to be hiding in the mountainous Afghan-Pakistani border region.51  While
the NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, reportedly stated that “NATO
is committed for the long term” in Afghanistan52 some believe that a substantial U.S.
military presence will be required throughout the duration of the NATO-led mission
to insure long-term NATO commitment. In addition, there are no treaty requirements
for NATO members to contribute troops to Afghanistan and NATO has had
difficulties in the past trying to muster sufficient troops and military resources for
operations using this “pass the hat” approach. If NATO troop commitments do fall
short, it is likely that U.S. forces would be required to make up the difference.  
Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs)
PRTs are small, civil-military teams originally designed to extend the authority
of the Afghan central government beyond Kabul and to facilitate aid and
reconstruction projects.  PRTs have enabled coalition forces to extend a degree of
security to outlying regions and have also permitted U.S. forces to establish personal
relationships with local Afghan leaders which some believe has helped to diminish
insurgent influence in a number of regions.53  As of July 2005, there were 22 PRTs
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 —13 supervised by the Coalition and nine by NATO.54  The 13 PRTs run by the
Coalition are located in the south and east — generally considered to be moderate to
high threat areas.  Twelve of the PRTs are U.S. and one is run by New Zealand. The
nine PRTs administered by NATO are located in the north and west in low to
moderate threat areas and cover approximately 50 percent of Afghanistan.  While
overall, the PRTs have been described as successful in accomplishing their main
missions and have played an important supporting role in other endeavors such as
training, counter narcotics, and election support, some NATO PRTs have been
described as “risk averse” and overly controlled by their nation’s political-military
leadership.  If all PRTs eventually transition to NATO control, some question if they
can perform as well as PRTs run by the United States and the United Kingdom.  
Training the Afghan National Army (ANA) 
Training of the ANA commenced shortly after U.S. and coalition forces
defeated Taliban forces in early 2002.  The Bonn II Conference on rebuilding
Afghanistan in December 2002 mandated a 70,000 strong Afghan National Army.55
Although the Afghan National Army initially experienced difficulties in terms of
morale and desertion at its inception, most analysts agree that the multi-ethnic ANA
has developed into a credible fighting force and eight of the ANA’s most experienced
battalions have been deployed to bases in the provinces where they routinely work
with U.S. and NATO forces.56 
In February 2005, the U.S. military doubled the number of tactical trainers that
are embedded with ANA units from 300 to 600 soldiers.57  The majority of these U.S.
trainers come from the U.S. Army National Guard and about 16 of these trainers are
assigned to each new ANA battalion and assist the battalion as it undergoes its 14-
week basic training course and then remain with the battalion, serving  as leadership
mentors when the battalion deploys for operations.58  As of February 2005, the
Afghan Army reportedly consisted of almost 21,000 officers and soldiers with
another 3,000 - 4,000 in training.59  While the U.S. military trains the soldiers for the
ANA, France also assists in training senior officers; Britain trains the non-
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ANA on its Soviet-era equipment such as artillery and tanks.60  In March, U.S.
officials began training six ANA battalions simultaneously — up from 4 battalions
per training rotation, and it is hoped that the ANA will reach its mandated strength
of 70,000 by the end of 2006 — a full year earlier than previously planned.61  In
addition to infantry units, the ANA has fielded two combat support battalions with
a 122 mm towed D-30 artillery battery and 82 mm mortars.62  The ANA has also
fielded a tank battalion, equipped primarily with T-62, T-55, and T-54 Soviet-era
tanks, and will eventually also field a mechanized infantry battalion equipped with
U.S.-made M-113 armored personnel carriers.63 
The Afghan government reportedly seeks to equip its military with high-tech
weaponry and  develop specialized units.  Afghan officials would like to acquire U.S.
Apache helicopters, A-10 ground attack aircraft, as well as transport aircraft and
armored vehicles.64 According to U.S. military officials, the United States and
Afghanistan are discussing the possibility of providing the Afghan military with
transport aircraft and helicopters.65  The Afghans would also like for the United
States to assist in creating and training commando, engineer, and intelligence units
for the ANA.66 
The War on Drugs67
Afghanistan’s opium industry is estimated to employ directly or indirectly
anywhere between 20 to 30 percent of the Afghan population and provides for almost
60 percent of Afghanistan’s gross domestic product (GDP).68  The cultivation of
poppies — used in making opium for heroin — which was  regulated and taxed
under Taliban rule, flourished after the elimination of the Taliban regime.69
According to a United Nation’s (U.N.) report, Afghanistan’s poppy harvest rose by
64 percent in 2004 — making Afghanistan the world’s leading source for opium and
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heroin.70  This situation has caused some to draw comparisons between present-day
Afghanistan and Colombia of the 1990s when that country became the leading source
of the world’s cocaine supply and was ostensibly controlled by large, well-financed,
and heavily- armed narcotics cartels.  Because terrorists and insurgents finance their
activities primarily through drug revenues, many now consider the Afghan drug trade
the most significant threat to the Afghan national government.71
In early 2005, DOD substantially increased its counternarcotics role in
Afghanistan. The U.S. military in Afghanistan now supports efforts by Afghan and
U.S. agencies such as the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) by providing helicopter
and cargo aircraft transport and planning and intelligence assistance.72  The U.S.
Army has provided training to DEA agents deploying to Afghanistan on weapons,
night vision devices, and how to spot landmines.  To fund efforts to combat the drug
trade in Afghanistan, DOD requested $257 million73 and Congress approved $242
million (P.L. 109-13, 119 Stat. 240) to fund facilities, equipment, communications,
and training, and to lease and refurbish helicopters for the Afghan government.74
These funds are in addition to the $15.4 million in DOD’s FY2005 Defense Budget
for counternarcotics assistance to the Afghan government. 
Britain is in command of the Coalition’s military counternarcotics efforts in
Afghanistan.  Reports suggest that Britain will step up military efforts next year when
the ARRC takes over command of ISAF and Britain deploys additional forces to
Afghanistan.75  British troops will supposedly deploy to southern provinces as well
as Helmand province in the southwest — an insurgent stronghold as well as the
center of the country’s opium trade. Largely facilitated by Congress, Colombia —
which has just resumed diplomatic relations with Afghanistan — is preparing to
assist Afghanistan by providing its counternarcotics expertise to Afghan police and
military forces.76  Raids by Afghan police and Coalition forces have enjoyed mixed
results, with large amounts of narcotics being seized but often times drug producers
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The United States is deeply concerned about the potential for Africa to become
a breeding ground for terrorists — citing its vast ungoverned spaces and unprotected
borders. Somalia has been referred to as a “lawless haven for terrorists,”79 and reports
suggest that Al Qaeda has opened recruiting bases in Nigeria, Somalia, Tanzania, and
Uganda.80  One report suggests that there is evidence of 17 training centers in Kenya,
possibly set up by groups related to Al Qaeda.81  The U.S. European Command (U.S.
EUCOM), which oversees military operations in most of Africa, has reported that
nearly 400 foreign fighters captured in Iraq have come from Africa and that some of
these veterans of Iraq are returning to places like Morocco and Algeria where their
acquired skills,  such as operational planning and bomb making, could be used
against their respective governments.82  While terrorism is cited as the primary reason
for U.S. military operations in Africa, access to Africa’s oil — which presently
accounts for 15 percent of the U.S. oil supply and could reach 25 percent by 2015 —
is also considered a primary factor for growing U.S. military involvement in the
region.83
In October 2002, the United States established Combined Joint Task Force
(CJTF) Horn of Africa (HOA) to combat terrorism in the region.  For the purpose of
this operation, the Horn of Africa is defined as “the total airspace and land areas out
to the high-water mark of Kenya, Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Eritrea, Djibouti, and
Yemen.”84  CJTF-HOA is headquartered at Camp Lemonier in Djibouti and consists
of approximately 2,000 personnel including U.S. military and Special Operations
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Forces (SOF), U.S. civilian, and coalition force members.85  In addition to CJTF-
HOA, Combined Task Force (CTF)150 is a naval task force consisting of ships from
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Pakistan, New Zealand, Spain, the United
Kingdom and the United States, and has the task of monitoring, inspecting, boarding,
and stopping suspect shipping not only in the Horn of Africa region, but also in
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom.86
Flintlock 2005
In June 2005, about 700 U.S. Special Operations Forces (SOF) personnel and
support troops conducted training for selected troops from Algeria, Chad, Mali,
Mauritania, Morocco, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, and Tunisia in a three week exercise
in Africa dubbed “Flintlock 2005.”87   The training was primarily conducted by the
10th Special Forces Group stationed both at Fort Carson, Colorado and Stuttgart,
Germany, and by members of the Army National Guard’s 20th Special Forces Group,
headquartered in Alabama.88  Normally, the 10th Special Forces Group is regionally
aligned with Europe and the 20th with South America, but the 3rd Special Forces
Group, stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, which has African language and
cultural skills, is currently deployed in Iraq. U.S. forces trained the approximately
3,000 African troops on a variety of skills including small unit tactics, parachute
operations, marksmanship, and land navigation, and a command post operation was
conducted to help promote regional military cooperation.89  Exercises  such as
Flintlock 2005 are designed to produce more effective counterterror forces to help
combat what the United States views as a growing terrorist threat in the region. As
of July 31, 2005, U.S. EUCOM had conducted 18 military-to-military exercises in
Africa, including exercises focused on military medicine, intelligence officer training,
and small-unit reconnaissance patrolling.90 
The Gulf of Guinea Guard Initiative
In February 2005, U.S. EUCOM launched the Gulf of Guinea Guard Initiative,
intended to aid regional governments by improving their maritime security off the
western coast of Africa.91  Under U.S. Naval Forces Europe (U.S. NAVEUR), the
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initiative intends to help ten West African nations92 over the course of the next ten
years to either develop or improve their maritime security.  While some suggest that
the initiative is intended to protect the region’s oil— Nigeria, for example, reportedly
has as much as $1 billion in oil stolen each year from its coastal pipelines — U.S.
EUCOM maintains that the Guinea Initiative will also help African nations combat
drug, weapons, and people smuggling, illegal fishing, and piracy. Initially, the
initiative will focus on African port security and will later expand to coastal regions
inside the countries’ territorial waters.  According to a U.S. government official, the
initiative will focus on and near land as opposed to the high seas, since most of the
vessels that terrorists use need shore-based support and most of the African nations
in question do not have ocean-going forces. 
The Philippines93
The government of the Philippines, a long-time and major non-NATO ally of
the United States, faces an insurgency threat from four primary  groups—three
Islamic groups who seek an independent state in Mindanao and one Communist
group which seeks a Marxist state.94  One group in particular, the Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG), has reported financial and training links to Al Qaeda and has become the
focus of the Administration’s counterterror efforts in the region.95  Estimates vary on
the size of Abu Sayyaf — ranging from one thousand to a couple of hundred fighters
 — and their activities were largely aimed at the Philippine government until 2001
when allegations emerged that Abu Sayyaf had been involved in planning the
assassination of the Pope during a planned visit to the Philippines and also had plans
to hijack and destroy 12 U.S. airliners.96  Philippine authorities reportedly suspect
that Abu Sayyaf had a role in the October 2002 bombing near a Philippine military
base, which killed three Filipinos and one U.S. Army Special Forces soldier.97 
Another group, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), with an estimated
10,000 fighters, is presently involved in negotiations with the Philippine government,
but there is reported evidence that the MILF provides training facilities to the Al
Qaeda affiliate Jemaah Islamiyah – an Islamic group based largely in Indonesia.98 
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Operations
U.S. military operations in the Philippines are limited by the Philippine
constitution (foreign military forces are not permitted to participate in combat
operations on Filipino territory) to training in counterinsurgency and counterterrorism
tactics, advising Filipino units, and participating in civil-military operations.  The
focus of civil-military operations is to limit the influence of insurgents with the local
population, particularly in the southern region where most Abu Sayyaf and other
Islamic insurgent group activity is focused. 
The United States has been conducting large joint training exercises with the
Philippines since 1981 called the Balikatan exercises.99 In February 2005, over 300
U.S. soldiers and 650 Filipino troops participated in Balikatan 05 in Quezon
Province, focusing on humanitarian operations.100  From June 25 to July 18, 2005,
U.S. Marines from Okinawa and about 400 Filipino Marines conducted small unit
field training exercises designed to improve interoperability.101  In July 2005, U.S.
and Filipino forces reportedly launched a joint operation on Mindanao in pursuit of
the leader of Abu Sayyaf, Khaddafy Janjalani.102  While an Abu Sayyaf spokesman
claimed that U.S. forces were engaged in direct combat, a U.S. military official stated
that U.S. forces were only supplying communications and intelligence support and
acknowledged that U.S. Army Special Forces and Navy SEALs were working in the
area with Filipino forces. U.S. Navy P3 Orion aircraft and unmanned aerial vehicles
were also reportedly  involved in intelligence support for this operation.  The United
States has been accused on a number of occasions by villagers and human rights
officials of participating in combat operations — including participation by former
U.S. soldiers working as DOD contractors — but the Pentagon has repeatedly denied
these allegations, and none of the reports have been confirmed by independent
sources.
  The United States has frequently conducted lower-level training exercises with
specialized Filipino counterterrorism and counterinsurgency forces.103  This training,
typically involving no more than 100 U.S. Special Forces troops at one time, focuses
on the training of individuals and small units on planning, tactics, and techniques and
also on specialized counterterrorism equipment provided to the Philippine Armed
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Forces.  Reportedly, the United States has also begun counter-drug training with the
Philippines, which is considered a major drug transhipment center and a major
regional producer of marijuana.104  
A Second Front for the War on Terrorism?
Some suggest that U.S. involvement in the Philippines is part of a greater U.S.
strategy to combat Islamic terrorism throughout Southeast Asia.105  Some U.S.
officials reportedly believe that Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front
have established connections with Jemaah Islamiyah, an Al Qaeda affiliate operating
across Indonesia and the Philippines, who are believed to be responsible for a string
of bombings including Bali in 2002 and the Davao bombings in 2003.106  A May
2005 report suggests that Abu Sayyaf has developed a “training relationship and
operational alliance” with Jemaah Islamiyah that could lead to new capabilities for
Abu Sayyaf.107  While some note the relative success of joint U.S.-Filipino training
exercises in combating Abu Sayyaf, others warn that increasing U.S. involvement
could “complicate” the Philippine’s insurgency dilemma and also possibly fuel anti-
American sentiment in the region, which could form the basis “of a new pan-Islamic
solidarity in the region.”108  Some experts contend that not all militant Muslim groups
operating in Southeast Asia are aligned with Al Qaeda, and it is important that U.S.
counterterror efforts in the region “do not motivate these potential affiliates to join
the Al Qaeda cause.”109
Colombia110
Colombia occupies a unique position in the Administration’s global war on
terror in that its targeted terrorist groups are Marxist as opposed to Islamic-based and
have no reported links to Al Qaeda or other Islamic groups. U.S. military
involvement began in 2000 under “Plan Colombia” and was limited to training
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Colombian counternarcotics units, although U.S. forces now train the Colombian
military in counterinsurgency operations.  Colombia has been involved for almost
forty years in what some describe as a civil war and others describe as a
counterinsurgency campaign against three major groups.  The first two groups, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia  (FARC) and the National Liberation
Army (ELN) started in the 1950s as Marxist revolutionary groups but reportedly have
lost most of their ideological support and have transformed into violent criminal
organizations.111   The other group, the rightist United Self-Defense Forces of
Colombia (AUC) is a conglomerate of illegal self-defense groups formed in rural
areas where the Colombian government did not exert a strong presence.112  All three
groups allegedly fund their activities through drug revenues113 and are on the
Administration’s official list of terrorist organizations.114  These groups also currently
hold a number of Colombian and foreign hostages whom they use as negotiating
leverage — these include three U.S. defense contractors who where taken by the
FARC in February 2003 when their plane was shot down.115
Current Situation
The majority of U.S. military personnel in Colombia are from the U.S. Army’s
7th Special Forces Group stationed at Fort Bragg, North Carolina. The National
Defense Authorization Act for FY 2005 (P.L. 108-375) raised the personnel cap in
Colombia to 800 military and 600 civilian contractors116 but reports suggest that as
of May 2005, only about 500 U.S. troops were deployed to Colombia — up from 320
troops in 2004.117  Some suggest that a shortage of U.S. Special Forces soldiers, due
to their deployment elsewhere, has limited the number of troops that can be deployed
to train Colombian forces.118  While some have criticized the military contribution
made by U.S. trainers as “small,” U.S. forces in Colombia claim that the training that
they have provided to the Colombian military has resulted in killing or capturing
more than 600 insurgents, the confiscation of huge amounts of arms and ammunition,
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and the destruction of numerous drug labs.119  While the U.S. military has enjoyed a
degree of success, the arrest by Colombian officials of five U.S. soldiers in March
2005 for cocaine smuggling and the arrest of two U.S. soldiers in May 2005 for arms
trafficking and their return to the U.S. to face military charges, has somewhat
tarnished the U.S. military’s image in Colombia.120
On July 9, 2005, the AUC stated that 4,000 of its members would demobilize
as part of peace talks between the Colombian government and the AUC.121
Approximately 5,000 of the AUC’s 20,000 members have demobilized and the
commanders of about 7,000 more members have stated that their forces are ready to
disband. Some in the U.S. government have criticized Colombia’s demobilization
plan as being “too lenient” and others suggest that these efforts will go a long ways
toward ending Colombia’s civil war.122 
A Resurgent FARC
The FARC, after having spent the last two years on the defensive as a result of
the Colombian government’s “Plan Patriota” to recapture FARC-held territory, have
launched an aggressive country-wide campaign against the Colombian government,
likely aimed to influence Colombia’s 2006 presidential elections.123  According to
reports, the FARC has restructured from a larger “front” (about 100 or so guerillas)
to companies of 54 and squads of 12 to avoid casualties inflicted by Colombian air
force bombings directed by U.S. intelligence sources.  The FARC has also increased
the use of improvised explosive devices, landmines, and snipers, particularly in areas
where force ratios do not favor FARC offensive actions against government forces.
Since February 2005, more than 100 members of the Colombian military have been
killed by the FARC and 732 soldiers have been killed since January 2004 – with
more than a third of them killed by land mines and explosive devices.  In June, the
FARC offered to swap three kidnaped U.S. defense contractors for two FARC
leaders that were captured by Colombia and extradited to the United  States to face
drug charges, but the U.S. government reportedly rejected the proposal.124 According
to U.S. Ambassador Wood, even though it is U.S. policy not to negotiate with
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terrorists, the Colombian government would include the U.S. hostages in any
prisoner exchange deal with the FARC.125
FARC Operations Outside of Colombia.126  Reports suggest that the
FARC has established cells in Honduras, Nicaragua, and Panama in what U.S.
intelligence officials believe is an effort to expand its arms and drug trafficking
operations. In addition, the FARC has reported links to Brazil, Mexico, Ecuador,
Peru, and Argentina, not only for the purposes of arms and drug trade by also to
establish refuges in selected countries.  Brazil and Ecuador are claimed to have
become important supply lines for the FARC where their jungled borders serve as
trans shipment points for drugs and arms as well as rest and recreation areas for
FARC guerillas.  While some view this as the FARC “extending its operations and
influence throughout Latin America,” others suggest that military operations by
Colombia have forced the FARC to seek refuge elsewhere as well as new sources of
revenue as FARC drug income has reportedly suffered due to Colombian counterdrug
efforts.  Reports suggest that Venezuela may be providing the FARC with weapons.
According to Colombian and U.S. officials, Venezuela has become the FARC’s
principal route for trafficking drugs in exchange for weapons. Venezuela has also
been accused of providing political support to the FARC, but Venezuelan president
Hugo Chavez reportedly stated that he is “neutral” regarding the FARC.127  
Issues for Congress
NATO Command in Afghanistan
Congress may opt to examine a number of issues concerning NATO’s
assumption of command of ISAF and Operation Enduring Freedom in 2006. Some
possible issues include:
! Is there a formal transition plan for the transfer of command to
NATO?;
! What will be the U.S. military role in the NATO command
structure?;
! Will this change of command require additional U.S. troops or will
it result in a reduction of U.S. forces in Afghanistan;
CRS-20
128 Rowan Scarborough, “Military Resists Ant-Drug Role,” Washington Times, October 26,
2004.
129 Peter Spiegel, “U.S. General Sees Significant Withdrawal in Iraq,” Financial Times,
August 24, 2005.
! How much say will NATO have in security and stability operations
and offensive operations designed to destroy the Taliban/Al Qaeda
insurgency? Will NATO be able to “overrule” the United States or
change existing policies? Will NATO assumption of command lead
to a less vigorous pursuit of insurgents?;
! What are NATO’s long-term plans to provide adequate forces for
security and stability and offensive operations? Has NATO secured
commitments from NATO members for troops and military
resources for at least the next ten years or will NATO continue to
“pass the hat” to obtain forces needed for Afghanistan?; and
!  Does NATO have a long-term strategy to transition all security and
offensive military operations to the Afghan government and its
armed forces and police?
Counternarcotics Operations in Afghanistan
Congress might act to review current Administration and DOD policy
concerning the U.S. military role in Afghan counternarcotics operations.  While the
insurgency remains a significant threat, the formation, training, and performance of
the ANA, the demobilization and assimilation of warlords and their militias, and the
progress made toward governance, suggest that the Afghan national government and
Coalition are successfully meeting these challenges.  Some suggest that, despite the
progress made to date, Afghanistan’s burgeoning drug trade has the potential to
undermine the Afghan government and provide the Taliban with the financial
resources needed to perpetuate the insurgency indefinitely.  
The current U.S. military role in counternarcotics operations is limited to
training, planning support, and the transport of police and troops.  The rationale
provided in the past for limited U.S. military involvement in Afghan counterdrug
operations was that active involvement “was not achievable given U.S. force levels
in Afghanistan” and that it could “significantly undermine its counterinsurgency
campaign.”128  While the United States has gone from a “no participation” policy to
a supporting role, critics suggest that a more active role is now possible as the
Administration has hinted at reducing troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq in the near
future.129  Given the possibility of these reductions, Congress might opt to examine
the potential impact of dedicating a relatively small force of U.S. troops to actively
conducting counterdrug operations with Afghan and NATO allies. Proponents of this
course of action argue that U.S. military experience in counterdrug operations and the
addition of a brigade or less of U.S. soldiers could significantly benefit future
counterdrug efforts and perhaps place a strain on the insurgent’s drug revenues —
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ultimately impacting their anti-government and anti-Coalition military and terrorist
operations. 
Africa and Long-Term Strategy
It is possible that Congress may explore in greater detail how Africa not only fits
into the Administration’s long term strategy for the war on terror but also what the
Administration’s specific strategy is for Africa, if such a strategy exists.  While
Combined Joint Task Force Horn of Africa (CJTF-HOA) has been in existence for
almost three years and the Gulf of Guinea Guard Initiative has been described as a
“ten year program,” little is publicly known about these long-term commitments to
the region in terms of overall strategy and what resources—both military and
financial—will be required to implement such a strategy. 
There are indications that if a strategy does not currently exist, one is being
developed by the Pentagon. According to a report, U.S. CENTCOM is planning for
a “long war” on terrorism and is looking beyond Iraq and Afghanistan,  to “a growing
threat of a loosely-affiliated network of extremists” that is “not fundamentally state-
based or state-sponsored.”130  CENTCOM notes that the focus of this strategy is to
insure that Al Qaeda and its affiliates “do not find a safe haven once they are forced
out of their current bases.”131  One concern is that once Iraq is stabilized  leaders such
as Abu Musab al-Zarqawi might move their base of operation to Africa. Given these
concerns, Congress might review the Pentagon’s emerging long- term military
strategy in the region as well as how other U.S. agencies, their resources, and
programs might fit into such a plan.
Abu Sayaaf and Jemaah Islamiyah
Reports that Abu Sayaaf and Jemaah Islamiyah are developing a training
relationship and operational alliance suggest to some the potential for an increase in
terrorist activities throughout Southeast Asia.  While the majority of these activities
would likely be against regional governments, the potential exists for attacks against
U.S. concerns and citizens in the region. U.S. military presence and ongoing
operations in the region are considered by some as  modest at best and might do little
to deter attacks or assist our regional allies in pursuing those responsible.  Given this
possibility, Congress might act to review the adequacy of U.S. military forces in the
region as well as their current mandate in terms of training and advising regional
military forces. 
FARC Operating Outside of Colombia
Congress may decide to examine the ramifications of the expansion of FARC
narcotics and arms activities into other countries.  While most agree that these
activities are preliminary at best and may be a symptom of the success of the U.S.
trained Colombian Armed Forces against the FARC, others see the potential for
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greater regional involvement by the U.S. military. Still others suggest that this
expansion has little to do with the Global War on Terror and that these activities are
criminal in nature and best dealt with by law enforcement.  Further study of this
expansion could be helpful in determining if expanded operations should be
addressed in the U.S. military’s war on terror strategy or by law enforcement
programs and activities.
